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Abstract. We analyze the interaction between globalization and labor market frictions in a dynamic 
general equilibrium North-South non-scale growth model with endogenous Northern innovation and 
endogenous Southern imitation. The employment, growth and relative-wage effects of globalization 
are shown to depend qualitatively on the degree of Northern labor market frictions. We demonstrate 
that Northern countries with particular severe labor market frictions benefit from globalization in 
terms of employment and growth. We also analyze whether stricter intellectual property rights protec-
tion in the South, rising R&D subsidies in the North or an increase in Northern labor market flexibility 
alleviate or aggravate globalization effects. 
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1  Introduction 
Factor prices are determined in general equilibrium. Therefore, wages of US or European workers are 
not ‘set in Beijing’ (Freeman, 1995). Instead, factor and product market conditions in all open coun-
tries connected by trade determine together the equilibrium wage rates in both developed Northern 
countries and in developing Southern countries. Thus, in face of rising competition (e.g., by imitating 
Northern production technologies) from low-wage countries like China or India, Northern wage rates 
do not have to decline to those Southern levels, and Southern wage rates are also endogenously deter-
mined in general equilibrium. In this paper we go one step further and ask the following question: how 
do the effects of ‘globalization’ – defined as an increase in the economic size of the open South – on 
Northern R&D-driven growth, the Southern imitation rate, Northern unemployment and the North-
South wage gap depend on the degree of Northern labor market frictions, as measured by a unified 
job-finding rate and firing costs? We also analyze how these economic variables are affected by 
stricter intellectual property rights protection (IPRP) in the South, rising R&D subsidies in the North, a 
decrease in firing costs or an increase in the job-finding rate. The framework used to tackle these is-
sues is a two-country (North-South) quality ladder model, which features a Vernon-type product cycle, 
neo-Schumpeterian non-scale growth with endogenous Northern innovation and endogenous Southern 
imitation. 
The effects of globalization and stricter IPRP have recently been studied in similar frameworks 
by Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2005a,b), Şener (2005), or Dinopoulos et al. (2005). However, they all 
assume a perfectly flexible Northern labor market, whereas other studies stress that labor market ri-
gidities could be harmful for open economies. A standard textbook argument says that the interna-
tional division of labor (which is speeding up during the current wave of globalization) is unambigu-
ously beneficial for the welfare of countries open to trade if, and only if, factor and product prices are 
sufficiently flexible, see also Sinn (2004). Furthermore, it is commonly accepted that adjustment costs 
for firms – e.g., because of the existence of closing-down or firing costs – and for workers – e.g., be-
cause they undergo a period of unemployment before they find a new job in a different industry – 
could result in welfare-reducing globalization effects even under flexible factor and goods prices. This 
standard hypothesis is reflected in recent studies of Angrist and Kugler (2003), who provide evidence 
on the negative employment effects (aggravated by labor and product market rigidities) of non-EU 
immigration to EU countries, and Arnold (2002), further discussed below. However, we will argue in 
this paper that these labor market adjustment costs will affect the endogenous globalization pressure 
from Southern developing countries (here: their imitation rate) in general equilibrium. We will show 
that accounting for these feedback effects from Northern labor market frictions to the Southern imita-
tion incentives can qualitatively change the effects of globalization and economic policies (like stricter 
IPRP and rising Northern R&D subsidies) in general equilibrium. Hence, the central new feature of 
this paper is that it introduces a theoretical link from labor market frictions in the North to the global-
ization pressure coming from the South, and the main new finding is that Northern countries with sig-  2
nificant labor market frictions for both firms and workers will benefit from globalization in terms of 
growth and employment. 
Recently, some papers have analyzed aspects of globalization within endogenous growth models 
with labor market frictions, including Arnold (2002), Şener (2001, 2004), and Grieben (2004). Arnold 
(2002) generalizes the North-South product-cycle model of Helpman (1993) in order to analyze the ef-
fects of rising Southern imitation on Northern growth and unemployment. In particular, he focuses on 
how these effects depend on the degree of Northern labor market flexibility, as measured by a unified 
job-finding rate. He finds that for a high (low) degree of labor market flexibility, rising Southern imi-
tation stimulates (impedes) Northern growth, whereas for an intermediate degree of labor market 
flexibility, this relationship is hump-shaped. Furthermore, whenever rising Southern imitation reduces 
Northern growth, it also raises Northern unemployment. Arnold’s findings suggest that Northern coun-
tries with more flexible labor markets (like the US) will be better prepared to adjust to rising competi-
tion from the South than countries with relative large labor market frictions (like some continental 
European countries). This accords with the view shared by many economists that in Northern coun-
tries with severely inflexible labor markets, globalization forces will ultimately result in an innovation 
and growth problem in addition to rising unemployment. 
We use a modified version of Arnold’s way of modeling the Northern labor market. Our model 
differs from his setting in three important respects. First, we analyze a semi-endogenous non-scale 
growth model (with vertical innovations), whereas his model belongs to the first generation of en-
dogenous growth models (with horizontal innovations) and hence features scale effects. As a conse-
quence, in our model, growth effects of globalization or economic policies will only be temporary. 
Second, we fully model the consumption and production side of the Southern economy, and thereby 
we derive the Southern imitation rate endogenously. As a consequence, instead of analyzing directly 
the effects of an increase in the Southern imitation rate, we look at the effects of globalization (as de-
fined above) which may result in increasing Southern imitation. Third, we introduce firing costs as a 
second labor market imperfection. As a consequence, we are able to analyze joint effects and the in-
terplay of two different labor market imperfections. For example, we show that globalization has 
markedly different effects in a Northern country with large firing costs and a high job-finding rate as 
compared to a Northern country with low firing costs and a low job-finding rate. 
Şener (2001) builds a neo-Schumpeterian North-North non-scale growth model with skilled and 
unskilled labor, an endogenous education decision, and matching unemployment for the unskilled. He 
analyzes the effects of trade liberalization between the two completely symmetric countries on growth, 
unemployment, the skilled-unskilled wage differential, and skill upgrading. Inter alia, when analyzing 
the case of a R&D technology similar to the one used in this paper, he finds that trade liberalization 
permanently raises the within-country skilled-unskilled wage differential, has no effect on the long-run 
unemployment rate of the unskilled, permanently increases the proportion of skilled workers, reduces 
the aggregate steady-state unemployment rate, and temporarily spurs innovation and growth. On the   3
one hand, our model is simpler since we abstract from different types of workers and an education 
choice. On the other hand, our model is more complicated since we model asymmetric countries and 
add endogenous imitation. Şener (2004) offers a neo-Schumpeterian non-scale growth model that also 
features an endogenous education decision. However, this is a North-North model with asymmetric 
labor market institutions (flexible-wage US and rigid-wage Europe), where the European wage rigidity 
generates unemployment. Şener aims to explain the empirically observed facts of rising European un-
employment, rising skill premium (more pronounced in the US), skill upgrading among workers, and 
rising R&D intensities. He finds that a combination of global technical progress in R&D technologies 
and an institutional response in Europe that raises the relative wage of unskilled labor can explain 
these empirical findings. Trade liberalization cannot help to explain these facts qualitatively, but it 
magnifies the quantitative effects of exogenous technological or institutional shocks. Grieben (2004) 
proposes a neo-Schumpeterian North-South non-scale growth model with an endogenous education 
decision and Northern wage rigidity. That paper analyzes the effects of a further compression of the 
relative wage and rising unemployment benefits for Northern unskilled workers as well as increasing 
education subsidies for skill upgrading, unemployment, wage inequality and growth in the North. 
Moreover, that paper emphasizes the relevance of North-South trade and incomplete Northern spe-
cialization for the labor market effects obtained in the model. 
Our model adopts the basic framework from Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2005a) – henceforth re-
ferred to as DS – who in turn build upon Grossman and Helpman (1991). DS develop a North-South 
neo-Schumpeterian product-lifecycle model with non-scale growth driven by endogenous Northern 
innovation, and with endogenous Southern imitation. Globalization takes the form of the entry of a 
large Southern developing country (the newly industrialized South) like China into the world free-
trade markets, where new Southern firms compete with the established Northern firms on the markets 
for qualitatively diversified consumer goods. The entry of the South is technically modeled as a dis-
continuous rise in the Southern population size. On the one hand, this form of globalization improves 
incentives for Northern quality follower firms to engage in R&D by raising the market size to which 
these firms (once they become quality leaders) can sell their products. On the other hand, this form of 
globalization “steals the business” of established Northern quality leader firms whose products are 
driven from the world market since they are imitated at lower wage costs by new Southern quality 
leaders. With intersectoral mobility of workers in perfectly flexible labor markets, the flow of produc-
tion jobs from the North to the low-wage South implies that more Northern workers are available for 
doing R&D in quality follower firms, which results in a temporary rise in the Northern growth rate 
above its steady-state level. Since R&D difficulty rises with the innovation rate, this positive growth 
effect peters out in the long run, and the steady-state rates of innovation and growth are not affected. 
Finally, since globalization raises the reward for Southern imitation by more than the reward for 
Northern innovation, the relative Southern wage rate increases in the new steady-state North-South 
trade equilibrium. Therefore, DS (2005a) conclude that globalization benefits Northern consumers in 
terms of a temporary innovation and growth push but hurts them in terms of a declining wage rate (ab-  4
solute and relative to the South), which decreases global income inequality.
1 We generalize the model 
of DS (2005a) by introducing firing costs and frictional unemployment. 
We find that the effects of globalization (and of all economic policy changes) on Northern em-
ployment and growth as well as on North-South wage inequality depend qualitatively on the degree of 
the Northern labor market flexibility. We derive critical threshold levels for firing costs and the job-
finding rate and show that if both measures for labor market adjustment costs indicate strong inflexi-
bility, Northern consumers experience a ‘double dividend’ from globalization: they benefit from glob-
alization in terms of employment and quality growth. This is no longer true for countries with either 
asymmetric (i.e., only one measure for labor market adjustment costs indicates strong inflexibility) or 
no significant labor market adjustment costs. Hence, our model does not support the popular view, as 
exemplified by Arnold (2002), that consumers in developed countries with significant labor market 
frictions necessarily benefit less from globalization in terms of employment and growth than consum-
ers in developed countries with more flexible labor markets.
2 Similar in spirit to our findings are the 
results of Schmidt et al. (1994): in their static model with skilled and unskilled domestic labor and un-
skilled immigration, it is precisely the labor market inflexibility introduced by a monopoly union de-
termining wage rates which opens up the possibility for low-skilled immigration (another facet of 
globalization) to raise domestic employment and output. The reasoning is that in the case of skilled-
unskilled complementarity and the labor union taking care also of skilled labor income, the replace-
ment threat to native unskilled workers induces the union to decrease the unskilled wage rate (even if 
it does not take  
                                                           
1  In a similar model by Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2005b), where the transfer of technical knowledge from 
the North to the South is not created by Southern imitation but by adaptive R&D investments of Northern 
multinational firms (FDI, employing Southern workers), an increase in the size of the open South does not af-
fect long-run North-South wage inequality. The reason for this difference in results relative to DS (2005a) is 
that globalization, although increasing the technology transfer to the South, does not change profits of North-
ern firms that simply switch production location – the increase in profits due to lower wage costs in the South 
is exactly offset by the incurred adaptive R&D costs. In yet another North-South product-cycle model with 
non-scale neo-Schumpeterian growth by Dinopoulos et al. (2005), where innovative Northern products are 
protected by finite-length global patents, the same type of globalization raises North-South wage inequality. 
2   Moore and Ranjan (2005) focus more specifically on the differential impact of exogenous shocks like global-
ization on skilled and unskilled workers for given differential labor market institutions. They build a two-
sector, two-factor model of a small, open economy with search unemployment of skilled and unskilled labor 
and no growth, where relative labor endowments determine comparative advantage. Wages are determined by 
Nash-bargaining between entrepreneurs and workers. Inter alia, Moore and Ranjan analyze the impact of trade 
liberalization in a skill-abundant economy (i.e., an exogenous increase in the relative price of skilled in terms 
of unskilled goods), depending on the degree of labor market rigidities as measured by the reservation utility 
of workers (the level of unemployment benefits). They find that a country with high unemployment benefits 
(‘EU’) has higher wages and unemployment rates for both groups of workers than a country with low unem-
ployment benefits (‘US’) before the trade shock. After trade liberalization, the unskilled (skilled) unemploy-
ment rate rises (declines) more in the EU than in the US, while the skilled-unskilled wage differential rises 
more in the US than in the EU. That is, unskilled workers are hurt from globalization in terms of rising unem-
ployment and a declining wage rate, while skilled workers benefit in terms of declining unemployment and a 
rising wage rate. Moreover, the higher labor market rigidities are, the more (less) pronounced will be the rela-
tive employment (wage) effect of globalization. These findings on quantitatively different relative employ-
ment and relative wage responses in Europe and the US to a common globalization shock for given different 
labor market institutions formalize the so-called ‘Krugman hypothesis’, cf. Krugman (1994a,b).   5
care of unskilled unemployment). This raises low-skilled employment and hence productivity of com-
plementary skilled labor. 
In order to protect domestic firms from imitation of Southern developing countries, politicians of-
ten call for stricter IPRP or consider to increase R&D subsidies for domestic firms to spur innovation. 
We find that stricter IPRP indeed serves to mitigate globalization effects. However, we derive the 
paradoxical result that if both measures for labor market adjustment costs indicate strong inflexibility, 
stricter IPRP results in an increase in Southern imitation, which demonstrates the importance of gen-
eral-equilibrium feedback effects from Northern labor market institutions to the Southern globalization 
force. An increase in Northern R&D subsidies is shown to reduce Southern imitation and to increase 
North-South wage inequality if there are either asymmetric or no significant labor market adjustment 
costs, while the opposite happens if both measures for Northern labor market adjustment costs indicate 
strong inflexibility. We show that a decrease in firing costs has always qualitatively the same effects 
as an increase in Northern R&D subsidies. Finally, just as stricter IPRP, an increase in the Northern 
job-finding rate (e.g., by reducing the amount or duration of unemployment benefits) also serves as a 
mitigation device for the effects of globalization. 
With large developing countries like China and India about to enter the open world markets for 
qualitatively diversified products
3, and with the ongoing public debate in advanced industrialized 
countries on how to protect domestic labor markets against the new competitors, our results will be 
relevant for discussing globalization effects for Europe or the US. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the building blocks of the 
model, which comprises household behavior, product markets, Northern innovation, Southern imita-
tion, and labor market equilibrium conditions. Section 3 derives the steady-state equilibrium. In sec-
tions 4 and 5 we provide our main results. We analyze steady-state equilibrium effects of globalization 
in section 4, while section 5 evaluates stricter IPRP in the South, rising R&D subsidies, decreasing fir-
ing costs and an increase in the job-finding rate in the North. Throughout sections 4 and 5, we also dis-
cuss steady-state welfare effects for Northern consumers. Finally, section 6 offers some conclusions. 
                                                           
3   Wacziarg and Welch (2003) use an updated Sachs-Warner index to determine whether developing countries 
must be classified as “open” or “closed”, based on the well-known five Sachs-Warner criteria averaged over 
the 1990s. Based in this index, both China and India are still closed but approach progressively the threshold 
of becoming open. China “[r]emains closed based on the undivided power of the Communist Party and its 
black market exchange rate premium, which averaged 36% between 1990-1999” (ibid, p. 41). India “did not 
satisfy the tariff openness criteria until 1996 when its average tariff rate fell from 41.0% to 38.6%”, and “In-
dia’s nontariff barriers have been recently reduced below the 40% coverage rate, although these measures 
seem to have been replaced with a flurry of phytosanitary measures and antidumping duties” (ibid, p. 43).   6
2  The Model 
2.1  Household Behavior 
The household side of our model follows the structure of DS (2005a). In both countries, there is a 
fixed number of households forming a dynastic family whose individual members have an infinite life-
time. The number of household members is growing at a common rate n > 0, and each household 
member supplies inelastically one unit of labor. There is full employment in the South, hence the 
Southern labor force is given by  ,, 0
nt
St S LL e
⋅ =⋅ . Due to a labor market imperfection to be discussed 
later, there is unemployment in the North, and its labor force is given by LN,t  = (1−ut)⋅LN,0⋅e
n⋅t = 
(1−ut)⋅ , Nt L , where  , Nt L  denotes the (exogenous) size of total Northern population at time t, and ut is 
the (endogenous) Northern unemployment rate at time t. We will allow  ,0 ,0 SN LL ≠ . 
Households in North and South share preferences and maximize the discounted lifetime utility 
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with constant time-preference rate ρ > n and the individual instantaneous CES-utility function
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Equation (2) is a quality-augmented Dixit-Stiglitz consumption index, where d(j, ω, t) is the quantity 
of a vertically differentiated good with j improvements of its quality in industry ω consumed at time t, 
λ > 1 is the size of each quality improvement in the case of successful innovation, and σ > 1 is the con-
stant elasticity of substitution between products across industries. As is a standard result in neo-
Schumpeterian growth theory, within industries, consumers buy only products with the lowest quality-
adjusted price, hence in (2), the sum over qualities j can be deleted. Across industries, consumers solve 
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⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ∫∫  .  (3) 
In (3), t is fixed, d(ω, t) is the individual’s quantity demanded of the product with the lowest quality-
adjusted price in industry ω at time t, j(ω, t) (p(ω, t)) is the quality index (price) of this good, and ct is 
the consumption expenditure at time t. The solution of (3) yields the individual’s consumption demand 
function
5 
                                                           
4  Apart from DS (2005a), the same type of preferences is also assumed in, e.g., Dinopoulos and Thompson 
(1998) and Li (2001, 2003). 
5   See Appendix A for a derivation.   7
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where q(ω, t) ≡ λ
j(ω,t) measures the product quality (of the good with the lowest quality-adjusted price) 
in industry ω at time t. The flow budget constraint of a household is 
  ( )    1 tt t t t t ar a w u n a c =⋅+⋅ − − ⋅ −  , (5) 
where a is per-capita asset holdings, r is the market interest rate, w is the wage rate (which is the same 
for all production and R&D workers within a country due to the assumption of perfect mobility across 
industries and between activities; however, since we assume international labor immobility, Northern 
and Southern wage rates will differ), and ut = 0 for a Southern household.
6 Inserting (2) and (4) into 
(1) yields the household’s optimization problem 
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subject to (5). Since the individual household takes prices and the evolution of product quality as 
given, the large second expression in the curly brackets in (6) can be neglected. The current-value 
Hamiltonian is 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) , , ,      ln 1 ttt tt t t J ca t c r n a w u c μμ ⎡ ⎤ =+ ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ − − ⎣ ⎦ . 
The first-order conditions lead to the usual intertemporal Euler equation 
     cc r ρ = −    ,  (7) 
which applies to both Northern and Southern consumption expenditures per capita, cN and cS. In a 
steady-state equilibrium, r = ρ since per-capita consumption will be constant for constant nominal 
wage rates wN and wS (real wage rates will have a positive steady-state growth rate due to ever-
decreasing quality-adjusted goods prices). 
2.2  Product Markets, Innovation And Imitation 
The industry side of our model is almost identical to DS (2005a), hence our description will be brief. 
In any industry ω ∈ [0,1], irrespective of the quality level of the corresponding goods, output equals 
                                                           
6   More precisely, we later assume that only Northern production workers can become unemployed because of 
stochastic Southern imitation, while Northern R&D workers remain always employed. Then, perfect within-
country labor mobility with risk-neutral (or perfectly insured) workers ensures that the wage rate for Northern 
R&D workers is only 1−ut times the wage rate for Northern production workers. Since both Northern wage 
rates are closely tied by this (stochastic) employment rate, it suffices to derive the wage rate for R&D workers 
– which will be denoted by wN – and the unemployment rate u in equilibrium. Then, any increase in u ceteris 
paribus will induce Northern production workers to apply for R&D jobs until the change in relative labor sup-
ply has equalized expected wage earnings per period.   8
labor input: YN =
Y
N L  in the North and YS = 
Y
S L  in the South. The R&D process specified below results 
in a unique quality leader in each industry who is protected by an exclusive patent on his production 
technology, and who charges an unconstraint monopoly price derived below. This patent expires in the 
case of two events: either another innovation (that is, an improvement of consumer goods quality of 
size λ > 1 in terms of the utility function) occurs in the same industry by a Northern firm, or the lead-
ing technology is imitated by a Southern firm producing at lower marginal costs wS < wN. In both 
cases, the previous incumbent immediately leaves the market and cannot credibly threaten to reenter 
(since he would make zero profits in an equilibrium with Bertrand price competition). In the North, the 
current quality leader maximizes global monopoly profits πN = (pN − wN)⋅(dN⋅LN + dS⋅ S L ) with respect 
to the price pN, where Northern and Southern demand functions are given by (4), respectively.
7 It re-
sults the unconstraint monopoly price pN = [σ/(σ − 1)]⋅wN in each industry with a Northern quality 
leader. Similarly, the successful Southern imitating firm maximizes global monopoly profits πS = (pS − 
wS)⋅(dN⋅LN + dS⋅ S L ) with respect to the price pS, which results in the monopoly price pS = [σ/(σ − 1)]⋅wS 
in each industry with a Southern quality leader. We follow the notation in DS (2005a) by denoting 
()
 1
 0 , t Qq t d ω ω ≡∫  the average quality level across industries (some of which are producing in the 
North, some in the South) at time t, E ≡ cN⋅LN + cS⋅ S L  the global consumption expenditure, and c = 
E/(LN + S L ) the global per-capita consumption expenditure (of employed workers). Then, from (4), the 




















  ,  (8) 
and the Southern equivalent  S d  is found by simply replacing pN by pS in the nominator of (8). It fol-
lows that global monopoly profits of a Northern quality leader can be written as 
  () ( ) ( ) ( )    1 NN N N S wd L L q Q πω σ ω =⎡ − ⎤ ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⎣⎦  ,  (9) 
which is the product of profit margin, total market size, and product quality relative to the average. 
Now we will consider Northern innovative and Southern imitative R&D activities. The R&D 
production function of a Northern innovating firm in industry ω is 
  ( ) ( ) ,   
I
iI N i IL q ω ηω =⋅   ,  (10) 
where Ii is a Poisson arrival rate, ηI > 0 is an R&D productivity parameter, and  ,
I
Ni L  is labor input of 
firm i, with  ,
II
Ni N iLL = ∑  being the total number of Northern R&D workers. The quality level q(ω, t) = 
                                                           
7  Note that Northern unemployed workers do not generate a positive demand since we abstract from unem-
ployment benefits for simplicity.   9
λ
j(ω,t) in the denominator captures the idea that with rising product quality (i.e., with each innovation 
success), further improvement becomes increasingly difficult since products become more complex. 
Hence, an ever increasing amount of R&D labor is needed to maintain a constant innovation rate Ii.
8 
R&D returns are assumed to be distributed independently across firms, across industries and over 
time, hence the industry-wide instantaneous probability of innovation is I(ω) =  ()
I
IN Lq η ω ⋅ . Simi-
larly, the Poisson arrival rate of a Southern imitating firm j is defined as 
  ( ) ( ) ,   
C
jC S j CL q ω ηω =⋅  (11) 
with R&D productivity parameter ηC > 0, and  ,
CC
Sj S jLL = ∑  being the total number of Southern R&D 
workers. Note that 1/ηC can also be viewed as a measure of the strictness of IPRP. R&D difficulty of 
Southern copying is identical to Northern R&D difficulty because the required technical knowledge 
for how to produce a particular quality of a given product is the same. 
With the assumption wN > wS > wN/λ
1/(σ−1), the successful Southern imitating firm replaces the pre-
vious Northern incumbent and serves the world market, and in the case of a further innovation, the 
new Northern quality leader replaces the previous Southern monopolist in turn, which closes the 
Vernon-type product cycle. Denoting mN (mS) the fraction of industries with a Northern (Southern) 
quality leader, in a steady state with constant I and C, the flow of industries ω with a new Southern 
quality leader must equal the flow of industries with a new Northern quality leader, thus mN⋅C = mS⋅I. 
With mN + mS = 1, it follows mN = I/(I + C) and mS = C/(I + C). 
Northern firms choose R&D intensity Ii optimally as to maximize expected benefits minus costs 
from engaging in R&D: vI(ω)⋅Ii − (1−sR)⋅wN⋅ ,
I
Ni L , where vI(ω) is the reward for innovating (derived 
below), and sR ≥ 0 is an R&D subsidy. With free entry into R&D races, optimal R&D investment sat-
isfies 
  () ( ) ( )    1 IR N I vs w q ω ωη =−⋅⋅  .  (12) 
Since product quality q(ω) stays constant during an R&D race, vI is also a constant, i.e.  0 I v =  . 
The usual no-arbitrage condition on the world stock market equates the return from a completely 
diversified portfolio of the stocks of Northern R&D firms and the save interest rate for a riskless bond, 
where both assets are held for a time period dt: 
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8  The underlying idea was first formalized in a neo-Schumpeterian growth model by Segerstrom (1998). The 
specification in (10) is a special case, also considered in DS (2005a), of the more general formulation in Li 
(2003, p. 1010).   10
All terms are standard for neo-Schumpeterian growth models except for the third term on the LHS 
taken from Grieben (2005). We specify that in addition to suffering from full capital loss in the case of 
either further Northern innovation or Southern imitation, the previous Northern incumbent firm has to 
pay firing costs, defined as F ≡ B⋅wN⋅q(ω) with B > 0 being a constant, each time it is replaced from 
the goods market and thus is forced to dismiss its workers. B will later be used as a policy variable. 
Firing costs are indexed to wN⋅q(ω) in order not to become negligible in the long run. Dividing (13) by 
dt, letting dt → 0 and using  0 II vv =   gives 
  ( ) ( )   IN vF I C I C πρ =⎡ − ⋅ + ⎤ + + ⎣⎦  .  (14) 
In the remainder we assume that B is sufficiently low such as vI remains positive in equilibrium. 
From (9), (12) and (14), we derive the following Northern steady-state innovative R&D condition 
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 ,  (15) 
where  NN x QL ≡  is a measure for the relative R&D difficulty. The LHS is related to the expected 
discounted cost of innovating, which rises with higher average product quality Q (implying higher 
R&D difficulty), lower R&D subsidies or lower R&D productivity. The RHS is related to the expected 
discounted benefit from innovating, which rises with a larger market size (in particular, with lower 
Northern unemployment), a higher markup price (i.e., a lower elasticity of substitution between prod-
ucts), and a higher average product quality which raises world average demand  N d . The RHS de-
creases with larger firing costs, a higher interest rate r = ρ, and a higher probability of being removed 
from the market via further innovation or imitation, which raises both expected firing costs and the ef-
fective discount rate (denominator of the RHS). 
Similarly, Southern firms optimally choose R&D intensity Cj as to maximize expected benefits 
minus costs from engaging in R&D: vC(ω)⋅Cj − wS⋅ ,
C
Sj L , where vC(ω) is the reward for imitating. With 
free entry to R&D races, optimal R&D investment satisfies 
  ( ) ( )    CS C vw q ω ωη =⋅  .  (16) 
The Southern no-arbitrage equation equivalent to (13) is
9 















⋅+ ⋅⋅− ⋅ − ⋅ =⋅

 ,  (17) 
where global monopoly profits of a Southern quality leader are 
                                                           
9  Note that no Southern firm would engage in copying products with a Southern quality leader, because Ber-
trand price competition would result in zero profits.   11
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )    1 SS S N S wd L L q Q πω σ ω =⎡ − ⎤ ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⎣⎦  ,  (18) 
similar to (9), with  () SNN S ddp p
σ =⋅ . From (17), the steady-state reward for Southern imitating is 
  ( )    CS vI πρ = +   .  (19) 
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  .  (20) 
As in (15), the LHS (RHS) is related to the expected discounted cost (benefit) of imitating with a simi-
lar interpretation of the terms. Note finally that we abstract in this model from the possibility that the 
South becomes itself an innovating country.
10 
2.3  Quality Dynamics And Labor Markets 
Before determining the labor market equilibrium for both countries, we need to derive (thereby repro-
ducing results of DS, 2005a) how product quality evolves in North and South, because this is closely 
related to the demand for production workers. From the definition  ()
()  1 1 ,
 0 0 ,
jt
t Qq t d d
ω ω ωλ ω ≡= ∫∫ , it 
follows 
  () () ()
() ()
 1 1 1
 0 0
      1   1
jj j Q I dI dI Q
ωω ω λλ ω λ λ ω λ
+ ⎡⎤ = − ⋅ ⋅=− ⋅ ⋅ =− ⋅ ⋅ ⎣⎦ ∫∫
  (21) 
since product quality jumps up from λ
j to λ
j+1 with each innovation that occurs with constant instanta-
neous probability I. As is derived in DS (2005a), in a steady state, a constant growth rate of Northern 
(Southern) average product quality  ( )   N NN N m Qm q dm ωω ≡∫  ( ()   S SS S m Qm q d m ωω ≡∫ ) requires 
equal growth rates  NN SS QQ QQ =  . Moreover, DS (2005a) derive 
  ( )    N QI Q I C λλ =⋅ ⋅ ⋅ +   and    ( )    S QC QI C λ =⋅ ⋅ + .  (22) 
From this and the industry fractions mN and mS, it follows QN/mN = (QS/mS)⋅λ, i.e. average Northern 
product quality exceeds average Southern product quality by exactly one quality jump of size λ.
11 
We now introduce frictional unemployment into the model of DS (2005a). This is done similar to 
Arnold (2002; see his motivation on p. 455-56) by assuming that Northern production workers not 
only lose their jobs because of Southern imitation (which forces the previous Northern incumbent to 
                                                           
10  See Currie et al. (1999) and Arnold (2003) for endogenous growth models that focus on phases of Southern 
development (in particular, the switch from imitation to innovation). 
11  This latter result makes clear that the South in our model should not be thought of as a developing country, 
but rather as a newly industrializing country that closely follows the Northern (quality-)growth path.   12
shut down), but it also takes time to reenter the labor market. More precisely, the unemployed produc-
tion worker’s instantaneous probability of re-entering the Northern labor market equals an exoge-
nously fixed constant β > 0, which implies an expected duration 1/β of unemployment.
12 This means 
that Northern employment LN <  N L  follows the differential equation 
  ( )   
Y
NN N LLu n C L β = ⋅+ −⋅   .  (23) 
Note two differences relative to Arnold (2002a) with respect to (23): first, the imitation rate C is en-
dogenous here. Second, since we have positive population growth in this model but want to abstract 
from demographic unemployment, we make the simplifying assumption that all newly-born Northern 
individuals immediately become employed and only lose their job if production moves to the South af-
ter imitation occurred. A common assumption in Arnold (2002) and this paper is that in the case of 
Northern innovation in an industry with a Northern quality leader, although production workers of the 
previous incumbent firm are also laid off, this does not cause additional frictional unemployment since 
the new incumbent firm instantaneously offers an equal amount of 
Y
N L -type jobs.
13 
Goods market clearing implies that global demand for a Northern product with average Northern 
quality must equal Northern supply of goods, hence 
  () ()       
Y N
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⋅+
 (24) 




N L . 
Using this, 
I
N L = I⋅Q/ηI from aggregating (10) over all industries ω (since innovative R&D takes place 
in both industries with a Northern and a Southern quality leader), and (24) gives 













as the steady-state equilibrium condition for the Northern labor market. Since the first term on the 
RHS of (25) is constant in a steady state, xN must also be a constant. This in turn requires QQ =   
NN N N LL LL n ==   , which by use of (21) pins down the steady-state innovation rate: 
  ( )  1 In λ = −   .  (26) 
Similar to (24), Southern goods market clearing requires 
                                                           
12  A microeconomically founded version of frictional unemployment within a neo-Schumpeterian growth model 
with matching on the labor market is developed by Şener (2001) and used in Grieben (2005). The simpler ver-
sion used here is more tractable without changing any of the results qualitatively. 
13  The case of non-instantaneous matching between the job offered by a new quality leader after successful in-
novation and unemployed workers is covered by Şener (2001) and Grieben (2005).   13
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S L . Using 
C
S L  = C⋅QN/ηC from ag-
gregating (11) over the measure mN of all industries with a Northern quality leader (because copying 
takes place only there), (22), (27) and the definition xN ≡ Q/LN gives 
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 (28) 
as the steady-state equilibrium condition for the Southern labor market. 
3  Steady-State Equilibrium 
In this section, we want to derive the steady-state equilibrium with the constant variables I, C, xN, cN, 
cS, E, c , r = ρ, wN, wS and with the variables LN,  N d ,  S d , and Q, all growing at the rate n. The equilib-
rium of DS (2005a) is obtained as a special case with a perfectly flexible labor market (β → ∞), no fir-
ing costs (B = 0) and no R&D subsidies (sR = 0). 
Using the fact that Northern steady-state employment must grow at the rate of population growth 













 .  (29) 
That is, the steady-state unemployment rate will depend positively on the Southern imitation rate and 
the proportion of production employment in total Northern population, 
Y
NN LL , since those jobs are 
vulnerable to Southern competition (or ‘threatened by globalization’). Steady-state unemployment de-
creases with the labor market flexibility parameter β and the population growth rate n (the latter is just 
an artifact of our assumption that newly-born individuals immediately find a job). Substituting for 
Y
N L  
in (29) from (24), using (15) to substitute for  N d , and using LN = ( ) 1 N uL − ⋅  again, finally yields 
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⎣ ⎦
 (30) 
as reduced form of (29), which defines the Northern steady-state unemployment rate as a function of 
the endogenous variables C and xN, given  ( ) 1 In λ = −  from (26). Obviously, u increases in both the 
relative R&D difficulty xN (since this implies a larger average product quality, which raises average 
demand for Northern goods and thus implies a higher Northern production employment, which is vul-
nerable to Southern imitation) and the Southern imitation rate C.   14
Next, we derive the equilibrium condition for the Northern economy by solving the Northern 
steady-state innovative R&D condition (15) for  N d  and substituting this into the steady-state equilib-
rium condition for the Northern labor market (25). Using again LN = ( ) 1 N uL − ⋅ , this gives the North-
ern steady-state condition 
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 (31) 
as a function of the endogenous variables C and xN. For B = sR = 0, (31) turns into the special case con-
sidered in DS (2005a). Similarly, solving the Southern steady-state imitative R&D condition (20) for 
S d  and substituting this together with LN = ( ) 1 N uL − ⋅  into the steady-state equilibrium condition for 
the Southern labor market (28) gives 
  ( )
() () ()
1
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 . 
Setting u = 0 (i.e., β → ∞) gives the special case considered in DS (2005a). Substituting for u from 
(30) finally yields 
  ( ) ( )
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 (32) 
as the Southern steady-state condition, which is also a function of C and xN. 
In order to derive the unique steady-state equilibrium of our model graphically, we discuss the 
slope of the two curves defined by (31) and (32), and we begin with the Southern steady-state condi-
tion. A first crucial difference to DS (2005a) arises because contrary to their special case, the slope of 
the Southern steady-state curve (32) is no longer unambiguously negative. The RHS of (32) is increas-
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 (33) 
is fulfilled, i.e. the Northern labor market must be sufficiently flexible as captured by the parameter β 
which measures the instantaneous job-finding rate of Northern unemployed workers. The benchmark 
is given by DS (2005a) as β → ∞ (perfectly flexible labor market). Hence with β > β
 crit (β < β
 crit), af-
ter a rise in xN, a decrease (increase) in C is required to restore equilibrium in the South, so the curve 
for the Southern steady-state condition (32) is downward (upward) sloping in (xN, C)-space, whereas 
for β = β
 crit it is vertical. With β > β
 crit, the interpretation of the negative slope is the same as in DS 
(2005a). An increase in the Southern imitation rate C raises both the proportion of industries mS with a   15
Southern quality leader serving the world market (which increases production labor demand 
Y
S L ) and 
the Southern R&D labor demand 
C
S L . For given labor supply, this requires a decrease in xN to ensure 
equilibrium on the Southern labor market. The decrease in xN not only reduces R&D labor needed to 
maintain a given imitation rate C, but it also reduces  S d  (and thus 
Y
S L ) needed for Southern monopo-
lists to break even, see (20). With β < β
 crit, an increase in C still raises mS and – ceteris paribus – the 
demand for Southern R&D workers. However, the resulting decrease in Northern employment LN is 
particularly strong, which means a marked reduction in the effective market size LN +  S L  for Southern 
producers and R&D firms, which in turn reduces labor demand in production and R&D. For given 
Southern labor supply, the net effect is a required increase in xN in order to clear the Southern labor 
market. 
The critical value β
 crit is increasing in all those variables and parameters that ceteris paribus also 
raise the steady-state unemployment rate given in (30): the larger C, xN, σ, ρ and B, and the lower sR, 
and ηI, the higher is u for any given β.
14 This means that if Northern unemployment is relatively high 
for a given value of β, the critical level β
 crit of Northern labor market flexibility at which the Southern 
steady-state curve becomes vertical is larger, i.e. an increase in C is more ‘likely’ to require an in-
crease in xN in order to clear the Southern labor market. 
Another crucial difference to DS (2005a) arises because the slope of the Northern steady-state 
condition (31) is no longer unambiguously positive. To see this, first we observe that the RHS of (31) 
is increasing in xN. Then, we differentiate the RHS of (31) with respect to C, use  () 1 In λ =−  and 
find that the RHS of (31) decreases in C – thus, the curve for the Northern steady-state condition is 
upward sloping in (xN, C)-space – if, and only if, 
  () ( ) ( )    1   0
crit
RI Bsn n B ρη <−⋅− ⋅≡ >  ,  (34) 
whereas for sufficiently large firing costs B > B
crit (B = B
crit) it is downward sloping (vertical). 
To interpret the slope of the Northern steady-state curve, we note that in the model of DS 
(2005a), with B = 0, β → ∞ and sR = 0, there are two steady-state effects of an increase in C in the 
North, which are also present in our extended model. First, with more Southern copying, the fraction 
mN of industries with a Northern quality leader declines, which means that less production workers 
Y
N L  
are needed. For a given supply of workers and no unemployment, these former production workers 
                                                           
14 Ceteris paribus, the Northern unemployment rate rises with a larger σ since pN decreases with a higher σ, 
which raises demand for Northern products and thus increases production employment vulnerable to Southern 
imitation. An increase in ρ means that Northern consumers want to increase present consumption relative to 
future consumption, which requires to raise production employment vulnerable to Southern imitation. A 
higher B or a lower sR increase Northern R&D costs relative to R&D benefits, which also tends to raise 
Northern production employment relative to R&D employment. Finally, the more productive Northern R&D 
labor is as measured by ηI, the less R&D employment is needed to sustain any given innovation rate, which 
ceteris paribus implies relative more production employment.   16
must be absorbed as R&D workers, and rising R&D employment implies a temporary increase in the 
innovation rate, which results in a permanently higher level of relative R&D difficulty xN. Thus, the 
first effect contributes to a positive slope of the curve for (31). Second, more Southern copying means 
a higher effective discount rate on benefits from innovating in (15), which requires a larger market 
size for given xN such that the innovating firms break even. Given the total number of consumers 
NS LL + , this requires an increase in global demand for Northern products with average quality  N d . 
Hence, output and demand for production workers 
Y
N L  must increase, which works in the opposite di-
rection (towards a lower level of xN) to the first effect. Thus, the second effect contributes to a negative 
slope of the curve for (31). With B = 0 and β → ∞, the first effect dominates the second, and the 
Northern steady-state curve is positively sloped. 
In our more general case, however, there are two additional steady-state effects of an increase in 
C in the North. The third effect comes from the fact that more Southern copying means more dismiss-
als of production workers in the North, which implies higher expected firing cost payments B⋅wN⋅q⋅C 
(obviously, the marginal impact of this effect will be the stronger the higher B is). This reduces the 
benefit from innovating in (15). Given xN, this again requires an increase in  N d  so that the innovating 
firms break even, hence an increase in 
Y
N L  is needed. Since for given  N L  this means a required decline 
in R&D employment 
I
N L , the third effect works toward a decline in relative R&D difficulty xN after a 
rise in Southern copying C (and hence toward a negative slope of the Northern steady-state curve). 
The interpretation of the expression for B
crit in (34) is now straightforward: the smaller the term (1 − 
sR)/ηI (due to higher R&D subsidies or higher R&D labor productivity), the lower are R&D costs for 
given average quality of goods Q = xN⋅LN (LHS of (15)), hence the higher will be the relative impor-
tance of firing costs in determining the change of R&D incentives in the case of an increase in South-
ern copying C. This means that if firing costs become relatively more important in this sense, the criti-
cal level B
crit at which the Northern steady-state curve becomes vertical is smaller, i.e. an increase in C 
is more ‘likely’ to require a decline in xN in order to clear the Northern labor market. Similarly, the 
larger the interest rate r = ρ, the more are expected firing costs discounted, which means that they be-
come less relevant, hence the critical level B
crit becomes larger. Finally, B
crit declines with rising popu-
lation growth rate n since firing costs are indexed to Q = xN⋅LN. 
Finally, the fourth effect works via a reduction of Northern employment. An increase in Southern 
copying raises the labor market turnover in the North, which for given expected length of unemploy-
ment spells 1/β implies a decline in total Northern employment  N L . On the one hand, this reduces the 
market size for Northern monopolists and thus the expected benefit from innovating in (15). On the 
other hand, however, while R&D difficulty is proportional to LN in (15), world demand for Northern 
products of average quality decreases by less than one for one with LN. Hence, the reduction in LN re-
duces R&D costs by more than R&D benefits in (15). To break even, this must be compensated by a   17
decline in  N d , implying a decrease in 
Y
N L  and thus an increase in 
I
N L  and xN. Therefore, the fourth ef-
fect contributes to a positive slope of the Northern steady-state curve. 
Figure 1 below illustrates all four cases for the steady-state equilibrium of our model economy 
(neglecting the special cases with either β = β
 crit – where the Southern steady-state curve is vertical – 
or B = B
crit, where the Northern steady-state curve is vertical). 
insert here: Figure 1 
Panel (a) illustrates the only case considered in DS (2005a), i.e. the case of a sufficiently flexible 
Northern labor market with sufficiently low firing costs, which could be classified as depicting the US 
economy. The other three cases could be classified as capturing possible cases for European econo-
mies, with either high firing costs but also high labor market flexibility, panel (b), or vice versa, panel 
(c), or with both high firing costs and a low degree of labor market flexibility, panel (d), – where 
“high” and “low” refer to the comparison with the critical levels β
 crit and B
crit, respectively.
15 
Given the steady-state solution (xN, C) in point A, all other variables are also determined, given I 
= n/(λ−1) from (26). 
I
NN LL = I⋅xN/ηI follows for given I and xN, and u is derived from (30) for given I, 
C and xN. For given C and u, 
Y
N L  is determined by (29). Since LN follows for given  N L  and u, 
I
N L  is 
also determined, as is the equilibrium path for Q = xN⋅LN. Given  N L , xN, I and C,  N d  is defined by 
(15) and  S d  by (20). As shown by DS (2005a), global per-capita consumption expenditure c  is found 
by noting first that 
  ( ) ( ) () ()
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With pN = [σ/(σ − 1)]⋅wN and pS = [σ/(σ − 1)]⋅wS,  N d  (or  S d ) and the wage rates determine c , which 
then determines global consumption expenditure E = c ⋅(LN + S L ). As for the wage rates, it suffices to 
                                                           
15 Obviously, an increase in B rotates the Northern steady-state curve (31) counterclockwise. In panel (b) of Fig-
ure 1 as well as in subsequent policy analysis, we consider only the case of a B > B
crit such that the absolute 
slope of this curve exceeds that of the Southern steady-state curve (32). Similarly, a decrease in β rotates the 
Southern steady-state curve clockwise, and in panel (c) we only consider the case where β < β
 crit is such that 
the slope of the Southern steady-state curve is larger than that of the Northern steady-state curve. According 
to (33), β
 crit is increasing in C and xN. Hence, along the curve for (32) towards lower values for C and xN, β
 crit 
is declining and will eventually fall below any given value for β, which explains the change in slope of (32) 
for low enough values of C and xN. Thus, the assumption β < β
 crit in panel (c) and (d) of Figure 1 and all later 
figures refers to the steady-state equilibrium on the negatively sloped segment of the curve for (32) above the 
(negatively sloped) β = β
 crit curve.   18
derive a constant relative wage wN/wS and to normalize e.g. wS ≡ 1. Dividing the Northern steady-state 
innovative R&D condition (15) by the Southern steady-state imitative R&D condition (20), and solv-
ing the resulting equation for  N d / S d , gives the “mutual R&D condition” 
  () ( )
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  .  (35) 
Here, the second equality follows because equation (8), its Southern equivalent and the monopolists’ 
markup pricing rule give  NS dd = (pS/pN)
σ = (wS/wN)
σ. (35) defines the relative Southern wage rate as 
an increasing function of the imitation rate C and firing costs B, hence it rises whenever the reward for 
Southern imitating rises relative to the reward for Northern innovating. It is constant in a steady-state 
equilibrium. Finally, our assumption wN > wS > wN/λ
1/(σ−1) that is necessary for the postulated Vernon-
type product cycle requires that 
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 ,  (37) 
which we assume to be fulfilled throughout our analysis.
16 This restriction becomes the less stringent 
the lower ηC relative to ηI and the larger sR is (i.e., the lower R&D costs are in the North relative to the 
South). Note also that an increase in ηI or sR not only widens the set of feasible levels of firing costs 
supporting the product cycle, but it also reduces B
crit defined in (34). B ≥ B
max would mean that the 
Northern wage rate is below the Southern wage rate, hence production would not shift to the South af-
ter imitation occurred. The Northern wage rate must decrease with larger B due to lower Northern 
R&D benefits, which reduces labor demand in the North. 
In Appendix B, we derive the following steady-state utility growth rate that applies to both coun-
tries: 









=⋅ − ⋅ =
− −

 .  (38) 
With respect to (38), two things are noteworthy. First,  zz   is declining in σ (the elasticity of substitu-
tion between products across industries) because for higher σ, markup prices of all quality leaders are 
                                                           
16 Differentiating B
max with respect to C reveals that for given I = n/(λ − 1) in the steady state, B
max is uniquely 
determined if, and only if, ηC⋅(1 − sR)⋅ρ ≠ ηI⋅(ρ + I).   19
lower, which reduces monopoly profits and therefore expected discounted benefits from innovation 
and imitation. With lower R&D intensities in both countries, product quality growth is slower. Second, 
contrary to the first-generation endogenous growth model of Arnold (2002) that still contains the 
scale-effect property, a rise in Southern imitation has no long-run growth effects in the North. This is 
because any change in R&D incentives (other than σ) is finally offset by a corresponding change in 
R&D difficulty in this TEG (“temporary effects on growth”)-version of a non-scale growth model.
17 
4  Globalization 
Globalization (a rise in  S L ) requires an increase in xN for any given level of C in the Southern steady-
state condition (32) in order to restore R&D and labor-market equilibrium in the South. This implies a 
shift of the corresponding curve to the right as shown in Figure 2 below. We first look at panel (a) of 
Figure 2. 
insert here: Figure 2 
In the case of a flexible Northern labor market (β > β
 crit) with relatively low firing costs (B < 
B
crit), starting from E0, globalization leads to a move of the steady-state equilibrium to E1 and thus to a 
rise in the steady-state level of R&D difficulty xN and an increase in the Southern imitation rate C. 
Southern imitation increases because there is more labor available for doing R&D. The rise in xN = 
Q/LN means that the growth rate of average product quality exceeds temporarily the long-run steady-
state level given by (21) and (26) as QQ n =  . This in turn means that R&D employment must in-
crease permanently in the North. These additional Northern R&D workers come from the production 
sector, because rising Southern imitation leads to a decrease in the fraction mN = I/(I+C) of industries 
with a Northern quality leader and thus to a decrease in Northern production employment (same effect 
as in DS, 2005a). Hence, since both C and xN increase, Southern workers gain in terms of their relative 
wage rate (remember from (35) that wS/wN rises unambiguously with C), and consumers of both coun-
tries benefit in terms of a temporary push of the quality-growth rate (since this is positively related to 
the rates of innovation and imitation, respectively).
18 However, Northern production workers suffer 
from increased unemployment according to (30). 
                                                           
17 In the alternative PEG (“permanent effects on growth”)-version, R&D difficulty rises with the size of the mar-
ket. Contrary to the TEG-version, this results in an endogenous steady-state growth rate that can be affected 
by public policies. See Dinopoulos and Thompson (2000) for further discussion and an empirical test of both 
versions of rising R&D difficulty. The PEG-version is applied in Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) in order 
to analyze steady-state-growth and wage-distribution effects of trade liberalization in a North-North model of 
neo-Schumpeterian growth with flexible labor markets. Further applications of the PEG-version within neo-
Schumpeterian growth models with imperfect labor markets can be found in Şener (2001) and Grieben (2004, 
2005). 
18 Since population growth in the South leads to a higher steady-state imitation rate, this reintroduces a kind of 
scale effect into the Southern economy. However, the steady-state growth rate given in (38) does not change.   20
Interestingly, the same results emerge in the case of an inflexible Northern labor market with rela-
tively low firing costs (β < β
 crit and B < B
crit) as depicted in panel (c) of Figure 2. Again, the increase 
in Southern copying implies that fewer Northern production workers are needed. In addition, because 
of the low Northern labor market turnover, the increase in unemployment is particularly strong and in-
duces many Northern workers to switch from production to R&D employment since the latter is not 
vulnerable to Southern imitation. Moreover, Northern R&D becomes more profitable since wN de-
creases with rising C for given wS ≡ 1, see (35). Therefore, xN also increases in the case depicted in 
panel (c). 
With β > β
 crit and B > B
crit, however, globalization leads to an increase in Southern copying but a 
decrease in the relative R&D difficulty as shown in panel (b) of Figure 1. While the increase in C 
comes, as before, from the simple fact that more Southern workers can do more R&D, the decrease in 
xN reflects a net reallocation of Northern labor from R&D to production despite the increased unem-
ployment risk for production workers and despite the decrease in wN. For large enough firing costs, the 
reduction in R&D benefits from the expected costs of future dismissals more than outweighs the de-
crease in R&D costs from the lower wN and the increase in R&D benefits from the larger Southern 
market size. Hence, Northern consumers and workers suffer from a temporary decline of the quality-
growth rate and a decrease in the relative – and absolute – Northern wage rate. The net effect on 
Northern unemployment is ambiguous which can be seen formally from (30), where a rise in C and a 
decrease in xN have opposite effects on u. This is because the absolute level of Northern production 
employment 
Y
N L  may actually increase or decrease. On the one hand, there are two effects working 
toward a reduction in 
Y
N L : first, the rise in Southern copying C tends to reduce it due to the decline in 
the proportion mN of firms producing in the North. Second, the decline in relative R&D difficulty xN 
explained before implies a temporary slowdown of Northern innovative activity and therefore a de-
cline in relative average Northern product quality ( N QQ  decreases if C increases relative to I, see 
(22)). Given relative goods prices, this reduces the world demand for Northern goods of average 
(Northern) quality and therefore Northern production employment 
Y
N L , see (24). On the other hand, 
there are also two effects working toward an increase in 
Y
N L : first, demand for Northern products rises 
because with rising C, wN declines and thus Northern products become cheaper, which raises relative 
demand  NS dd  for given average product quality, see (35). Second, 
Y
N L  rises ceteris paribus simply 
because of the decrease in R&D profitability for B > B
crit explained before. The net effect on Northern 
production employment – and hence on u – is ambiguous. 
With β < β
 crit and B > B
crit, globalization results in an increase in xN but a decrease in C as is 
shown in panel (d) of Figure 1. This is a rather paradoxical case since more Southern labor resources 
actually produce less imitative R&D in equilibrium. It happens because of the combination of two ef-
fects: first, Southern R&D firms have to take into account that increasing their imitation activity would 
significantly reduce the effective market size of the North (i.e., strongly raise Northern unemploy-  21
ment) because of the low labor market turnover parameter β, which reduces Southern R&D benefits. 
Of course, this effect applies also to the case with β < β
 crit and B < B
crit discussed before. Second, 
Southern R&D firms have to take into account that increasing their imitation activity would signifi-
cantly raise dismissal costs of Northern R&D firms facing a high firing cost parameter B, which would 
more than offset rising innovative R&D benefits that result from the larger Southern market size. 
Hence, innovation activity would decrease in the North, and a larger proportion of Northern workers 
would then be employed in goods production. Given a low β, this would further increase Northern un-
employment, reinforcing the first negative effect on Southern imitation incentives.
19 
Hence, the Southern imitation rate C declines, which implies a significant reduction in Northern 
expected firing costs due to B > B
crit and therefore induces Northern quality follower firms to increase 
innovative R&D expenditures. This results in a temporary increase in the Northern innovation rate, 
thus xN and 
I
N L  increase permanently. The relative Northern wage rate rises because of the decline in 
C. Northern unemployment unambiguously declines despite the opposite effects on C and xN
 20: while 
C declines (lower unemployment risk for Northern production workers), 
Y
N L  may rise since the pro-
portion of industries mN = I/(I+C) producing in the North increases (it may also decline because of the 
rising R&D-labor demand). Then, however, both 
Y
N L  and 
I
N L  increase, and since () 1 N uL −⋅ =  
YI
NN LL + , this requires a decrease in u. Alternatively, if 
Y
N L  in fact declines despite the increase in mN, 
then the joint decrease in 
Y
N L  and C necessarily implies a decline in u. We can summarize our findings 
in 
Proposition 1: Starting from a steady-state equilibrium with (37) being fulfilled, global-
ization (i.e., an increase in  S L ) results in 
i.)  a permanent increase in the rate of Southern copying (C ↑), a permanent increase in 
relative R&D difficulty (xN ↑), a short-run increase in Northern innovation and the 
quality-growth rate (I ↑,  QQ  ↑) above their steady-state levels, no change in the 
long-run innovation rate  ( ) 1 In λ =− , a permanent decrease in North-South wage 
inequality ( NS ww ↓), and an increase in the Northern unemployment rate (u ↑), if 
B < B
crit, independent of the value for β; 
ii.)  a permanent increase in the rate of Southern copying (C ↑), a permanent decrease in 
relative R&D difficulty (xN ↓), a short-run decrease in Northern innovation and the 
quality-growth rate (I ↓,  QQ  ↓) below their steady-state levels, no change in the 
                                                           
19 Note that this negative net effect on Southern imitation incentives does not contradict globalization which 
happened in the first place since globalization is not modeled by a deliberate policy choice of the South (like 
trade liberalization) but by an increase in an exogenous Southern parameter,  S L . 
20 Remember from (30) that these two endogenous variables are positively correlated with u.   22
long-run innovation rate  ( ) 1 In λ =− , and a permanent decrease in North-South 
wage inequality ( NS ww ↓), while the net effect on Northern unemployment is am-
biguous, if β > β
 crit and B > B
crit; 
iii.) a permanent decrease in the rate of Southern copying (C ↓), a permanent increase in 
relative R&D difficulty (xN ↑), a short-run increase in Northern innovation and the 
quality-growth rate (I ↑,  QQ  ↑) above their steady-state levels, no change in the 
long-run innovation rate  ( ) 1 In λ =− , a permanent increase in North-South wage 
inequality ( NS ww ↑), and a decrease in the Northern unemployment rate (u ↓), if β 
< β
 crit and B > B
crit. 
To provide a comprehensive assessment of the welfare effects of globalization for Northern con-
sumers would require to take into account the complete adjustment paths of all endogenous variables 
during the transition from the old to the new steady-state equilibrium. Due to the complexity of the 
model, this task is beyond the scope of our paper. Nevertheless, the following negative steady-state 
welfare effects of globalization can be established for the representative Northern consumer in our 
model: with B < B
crit, globalization hurts consumers in terms of a declining wage rate wN and a rising 
unemployment rate u. However, these two negative static welfare effects have to be weighed up 
against three positive welfare effects: first, the innovation rate I spurs up temporarily which raises 
permanently the average quality level Q = xN⋅LN of consumer goods (dynamic welfare gain). Second, 
consumers can buy a larger proportion mS of relatively low-priced Southern consumer goods (with 
fixed pS = σ/(σ − 1)) than before the globalization shock (purchasing power effect, representing a static 
welfare gain). Third, because of the decline in wN, Northern consumer goods become cheaper. The lat-
ter effect does not fully compensate Northern employed workers for their nominal wage decline: wN/pN 
= (σ − 1)/σ stays constant, but the proportion of Northern goods mN in the consumer goods basket de-
clines.
21 These results hold true independently of the degree of Northern labor market flexibility as 
measured by the instantaneous job-finding rate β. 
In a Northern economy with firing costs exceeding the critical level given in (34), the welfare ef-
fects of globalization depend crucially on β. With β exceeding the critical level given in (33), Northern 
consumers are hurt by globalization in terms of a temporary growth decline and a permanent wage de-
crease, while they benefit from the facts that they can buy a larger proportion of relatively low-priced 
Southern consumer goods (positive purchasing power effect), and that Northern consumer goods be-
come cheaper. With β below the critical level, all these effects are reversed, and in addition, Northern
                                                           
21 As is noted by DS (2005a), the Northern representative consumer’s expenditure cN is not determined in this 
model as long as we make no further assumption about the international distribution of firm ownership. 
Hence, we cannot infer possible welfare effects from changes in consumption quantities.   23
unemployment declines unambiguously. Table 1 below summarizes the steady-state welfare effects 
(blue = welfare-increasing, red = welfare-reducing) from globalization for Northern consumers. 
Table 1: Steady-state welfare effects of globalization for Northern consumers 
  ( ) NN wp Δ   u Δ   Q Δ   S m Δ  
B < B
crit, β > β
 crit  constant  > 0  > 0  > 0 
B > B
crit, β > β
 crit  constant  ambiguous  < 0  > 0 
B < B
crit, β < β
 crit  constant  > 0  > 0  > 0 
B > B
crit, β < β
 crit  constant  < 0  > 0  < 0 
The net welfare effect is ambiguous in all four cases. However, we can conclude that in the long 
run, consumers in Northern economies with inflexible labor markets do not necessarily suffer more 
from globalization than consumers in countries with a more flexible labor market. In particular, a – 
probably unexpected – result is that consumers in Northern countries with large labor market adjust-
ment costs for both firms and workers (B > B
crit and β < β
 crit) benefit from globalization in terms of 
employment and quality growth (which could be termed a ‘double dividend’ of globalization), while 
this is not true for countries with either asymmetric or no significant labor market adjustment costs. 
The reason for this non-standard result is that the Southern imitation rate decreases with globalization 
in the case of a very inflexible Northern labor market because of the resulting general-equilibrium 
feedback effects on Southern R&D firms. This cannot happen of course in models like Arnold (2002) 
where the Southern imitation rate is exogenously fixed. 
5  Policy Analysis 
5.1  Stricter Intellectual Property Rights Protection (IPRP) 
As in DS (2005a), stricter IPRP is modeled as a decrease in the imitation productivity parameter ηI in 
(11), which reduces the imitation rate C for any given R&D labor input 
C
S L  and relative R&D diffi-
culty xN. As can be seen from our two steady-state conditions (31) and (32), this works exactly oppo-
site to globalization (increase in  S L ), hence the shift of the Southern steady-state curve in Figure 1 and 
all effects summarized in Proposition 1 are simply reversed for a decrease in ηI – stricter IPRP serves 
as a mitigation device for the effects of the type of globalization we studied in this paper. Note in par-
ticular the paradoxical effect on Southern imitation incentives in the case β < β
 crit and B > B
crit: stricter 
IPRP results in an increase in Southern imitation! The intuition parallels our discussion of the global-
ization effects above.   24
In the North-South product-cycle model with non-scale endogenous growth of Şener (2005), suc-
cessful Northern innovators engage in innovation-deterring and imitation-deterring activities (like lob-
bying or patent litigation, also termed “rent-protection activities”), aimed at reducing the innovation 
and imitation probability of Northern and Southern rivals, respectively. He finds that stricter IPRP re-
duces both the Southern imitation rate and total Northern rent-protection activities. However, this does 
not lead to more Northern innovation because of important equilibrium effects in the Northern labor 
market: less Southern imitation implies that a larger proportion of industries produces in the North, 
which raises labor demand and increases the Northern wage rate, hence innovation costs increase. The 
net effect is a decrease in the Northern innovation rate (although it decreases proportionally less than 
the Southern imitation rate), and the North-South wage gap rises. Contrary to DS (2005a) or to our ex-
tended model, stricter IPRP does not serve to mitigate globalization effects in Şener (2005) since 
there, an increase in the relative size of the open South raises the Southern imitation rate (as in our 
model for all cases except the paradoxical case β < β
 crit and B > B
crit, see Figure 2), but increases 
North-South wage inequality and reduces Northern innovation. The reason for these different results is 
that an increase in the relative size of the South and the Southern imitation rate leads to an increase in 
Northern imitation-deterring activities, such that the net effect is a decrease in Southern imitation prof-
itability relative to Northern innovation profitability. This results in an increase in the relative North-
ern wage rate and therefore leads to a negative net effect on Northern innovation incentives.
22 Şener 
emphasizes the importance of general-equilibrium effects associated with labor markets – in particu-
lar, the net effects on wage rates – in deriving his results, which is also a major concern of our paper. 
However, we see that including sufficiently large labor market frictions may overturn some of the 
general-equilibrium effects obtained for the case of flexible labor markets. 
5.2  R&D Subsidies 
An increase in sR affects the steady-state conditions (31) and (32) as is depicted in Figure 3 below: the 
Northern steady-state curve shifts to the right, and the Southern steady-state curve shifts to the left. 
insert here: Figure 3 
As can be seen in Figure 3, the movement of C after an increase in sR is unambiguous in all four 
cases, but the movement of xN is ambiguous in panel (a) and (d). To determine the net effect on xN, we 
totally differentiate (31) and (32), holding xN constant. This gives, using  ( ) 1 In λ = − , 
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 ,  (39) 
                                                           
22 However, Şener (2005) qualifies this finding insofar as the net effects on Northern innovation and the relative 
Northern wage rate may be overturned if Northern incumbents hire only Northern labor for both innovation-
deterring activities in the North and imitation-deterring activities in the South. By contrast, in his model, he 
assumes that Southern labor is hired for imitation-deterring activities in the South.   25
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which is negative if, and only if, β  > β
 crit. In panel (a), the size of the downward shift of (31) is larger 
than that of the downward shift of (32) for constant xN if, and only if, 
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 .  (41) 
Therefore, for given other parameters, in panel (a) the net effect of an increase in sR on xN is positive 
(i.e., the downward shift of the curve for (31) is larger than the downward shift of the curve for (32)) if 
β −β
 crit > 0 is sufficiently large compared to B
crit−B > 0, which would mean that the labor market in-
flexibility problem must not be ‘too severe’ compared to the firing costs problem. In panel (d) we ob-
tain exactly the opposite condition for dxN/dsR > 0. 
A common feature of the cases (a) – (c) in Figure 3 is that an increase in Northern R&D subsidies 
reduces the Southern imitation rate, which results in an increase in North-South wage inequality. To 
understand this finding, we first note that an increase in sR reduces Northern R&D costs and therefore 
temporarily spurs innovation and raises R&D employment 
I
N L  permanently (because xN rises), which 
explains the shift of the curve for (31) to the right. By relocating Northern employment from produc-
tion to R&D, Northern workers become less vulnerable to Southern imitation on average, hence the 
unemployment rate u declines ceteris paribus. An increase in xN raises Southern R&D costs (LHS of 
(20)), and an increase in the Northern effective market size LN raises Southern R&D costs by more 
than it raises Southern R&D benefits in (20). Together, this explains the downward shift of the curve 
for (32) in panel (a) and (b) of Figure 3, where β  > β
 crit. However, with β  < β
 crit (panel (c) and (d)), 
Southern R&D firms have to consider the following: an increase in the copying intensity C would ac-
tually further improve imitation incentives since the resulting increase in the relative Southern wage 
rate would be more than compensated by the resulting large decrease in the Northern market size (u 
increases significantly), which decreases Southern R&D costs by more than it decreases Southern 
R&D benefits in (20).
23 Therefore, for a sufficiently inflexible Northern labor market, an increase in 
Northern R&D subsidies can actually improve Southern imitation incentives for given xN, which ex-
plains the upward shift of the curve for (32) in panel (c) and (d) of Figure 3, where β  < β
 crit. However, 
the general-equilibrium effect on C resulting from this upward shift of the Southern steady-state curve 
can only be positive if the Northern steady-state curve is negatively sloped (panel (d)). We can sum-
marize our findings in 
                                                           
23  This effect does not endure ad infinitum because u cannot continue to rise beyond 1.   26
Proposition 2: Starting from a steady-state equilibrium with (37) being fulfilled, an in-
crease in the Northern R&D subsidy rate sR results in 
i.)  a permanent decrease in the rate of Southern copying (C ↓) and a permanent in-
crease in North-South wage inequality ( NS ww ↑), if either β > β
 crit, independent of 
the value for B, or if β < β
 crit and B < B
crit; 
ii.)  a permanent increase in the rate of Southern copying (C ↑) and a permanent de-
crease in North-South wage inequality ( NS ww ↓), if β < β
 crit and B > B
crit; 
iii.) a permanent increase in relative R&D difficulty (xN ↑), a short-run increase in North-
ern innovation and the quality-growth rate (I ↑, QQ  ↑) above their steady-state lev-
els, no change in the long-run innovation rate  ( ) 1 In λ = − , and an ambiguous effect 
on the Northern unemployment rate u, if β > β
 crit and B > B
crit; 
iv.) a permanent decrease in relative R&D difficulty (xN  ↓), a short-run decrease in 
Northern innovation and the quality-growth rate (I ↓,  QQ  ↓) below their steady-
state levels, no change in the long-run innovation rate  ( ) 1 In λ = − , and a negative 
effect on the Northern unemployment rate (u ↓), if β < β
 crit and B < B
crit; 
v.)  an ambiguous permanent effect on xN (and hence also on u), if either β > β
 crit and B 
< B
crit or vice versa (β < β
 crit and B > B
crit), depending on the relative significance of 
the labor market flexibility problem and the firing cost problem as measured by (41). 
5.3  Reducing Employment Protection: Lower Adjustment Costs For Northern Firms 
A decrease in B affects the steady-state conditions (31) and (32) exactly in the same way as an in-
crease in sR, depicted in Figure 3 above: the Northern steady-state curve shifts to the right, and the 
Southern steady-state curve shifts to the left. Hence, the movement of C after a decrease in B is again 
unambiguous in all four cases, and the movement of xN is again ambiguous in panel (a) and (d). To de-
termine the net effect on xN, we totally differentiate (31) and (32), holding xN constant. This gives, us-
ing  () 1 In λ =− , 
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which is again negative if, and only if, β  > β
 crit. The size of the shift of (31) is larger than the shift of 
(32) for constant xN if, and only if, (41) is fulfilled. The interpretation of the sizes of the relative shifts   27
of both curves after a decrease in B, as well as the interpretation of the shifts of the curves themselves, 
exactly equal our discussion of an increase in sR before. Therefore, Proposition 2 also applies to a de-
crease in the firing costs parameter B. Table 2 below summarizes the steady-state welfare effects of a 
decrease in firing costs for Northern consumers, similar to Table 1 before on the welfare effects of 
globalization. 
Table 2: Steady-state welfare effects of a decrease in firing costs for Northern consumers 
  ( ) NN wp Δ   u Δ   Q Δ   S m Δ  
 
B < B





(< 0 if (41) 
is violated) 
ambiguous 
(> 0 / < 0 if (41) is ful-




crit, β > β
 crit  constant  ambiguous  > 0  < 0 
B < B
crit, β < β
 crit  constant  < 0  < 0  < 0 
 
B > B







(> 0 / < 0 if (41) is ful-
filled / violated) 
 
> 0 
From a political economy point of view, the negative employment effect of globalization for B < 
B
crit (see Table 1) is probably the most relevant. According to Table 2 and given B < B
crit, this could be 
compensated by a further decrease in firing costs. However, if either β > β
 crit and (41) is violated, or if 
β < β
 crit, this would unambiguously thwart the positive quality-growth effect of globalization, and in 
any case it would thwart the positive purchasing power effect of globalization. 
Finally, note that in the closed-economy, neo-Schumpeterian model in Grieben (2005) with non-
instantaneous matching on the labor market and endogenous creative destruction, a decrease in firing 
costs increases the steady-state unemployment rate unambiguously. That result differs from our less 
clear findings here for three reasons: first, there are no feedback effects from a second country in 
Grieben (2005). Second, in a matching framework with endogenous creative destruction, a decrease in 
firing costs raises the innovation rate which immediately increases layoffs. Contrary to the framework 
in this paper, Grieben (2005) does not assume that in the case of domestic innovation, the new North-
ern quality leader instantaneously offers an equal amount of jobs. Third, economic growth is endoge-
nous in Grieben (2005) instead of semi-endogenous as it is in this paper, hence the increase in the in-
novation rate is permanent instead of temporary. 
5.4  Increasing Labor Market Flexibility: Lower Adjustment Costs For Northern 
Workers 
In practice, an increase in β could mean to provide incentives for unemployed workers to intensify job 
search, e.g. by reducing the level or duration of unemployment benefit payments. Alternatively, it 
could mean an increase in the efficiency of the placement service. Formally, an increase in β does not   28
affect the Northern steady-state curve (31), but it shifts the Southern steady-state curve (32) to the left 
as is shown in Figure 4 below. 
insert here: Figure 4 
The steady-state effects are exactly opposite to that of globalization (increase in  S L ) and identical 
to that of stricter IPRP (decrease in ηI). In the case of a flexible Northern labor market (β > β
 crit) with 
relatively low firing costs (B < B
crit), starting from E0, an increase in Northern labor market flexibility 
leads to a move of the steady-state equilibrium to E1 and thus to a decrease in the steady-state level of 
R&D difficulty xN and a decrease in the Southern imitation rate C. To understand these results, first 
note that the immediate effect of an increase in β is a decrease in Northern unemployment, see (30), 
hence there is more labor available for both production and R&D (LN rises). However, dividing both 
sides of (15) or (20) by LN demonstrates that in both countries, ceteris paribus discounted R&D bene-
fits decline relative to R&D costs: while R&D difficulty is proportional to LN, world demand for 
Northern or Southern products of average quality increases by less than one for one with LN. The ex-
planation for the leftward shift of the Southern steady-state curve is the same as given before when 
discussing the steady-state effects of an increase in the Northern R&D subsidy rate sR. Hence, if the 
Northern labor market is relatively flexible (i.e., β > β
 crit), a further increase in β reduces Southern 
imitation incentives, while the opposite holds true if the Northern labor market is relatively inflexible 
(β < β
 crit). However, the general equilibrium effect on C can only be positive if the Northern steady-
state curve is negatively sloped as in panel (d) of Figure 4. 
To sum up, all effects stated in Proposition 1 and Table 1 are simply reversed for an increase in β 
– just as stricter IPRP, a more flexible Northern labor market also serves as a mitigation device for the 
effects of the type of globalization we studied here. Ceteris paribus, it improves the welfare of the rep-
resentative Northern consumer by alleviating the negative employment effects of globalization for B < 
B
crit. At the same time, however, it unambiguously thwarts the positive quality-growth effect and the 
positive purchasing power effect of globalization. 
6  Conclusions 
This paper emphasizes that the Southern ‘globalization threat’ for the labor markets in advanced in-
dustrialized countries is determined in general equilibrium and is thus endogenous. In the case of our 
model, the degree of Northern labor market frictions (firing costs, job-finding rate) determines both 
the size of the Southern imitation rate and the sign of the globalization effects on employment, growth 
and wage rates. Inter alia, our results contradict the popular view that consumers in Northern countries 
with flexible labor markets will necessarily benefit most from the current wave of globalization, as 
measured by the entry of large developing countries like China and India into the world free-trade 
markets. For example, we have shown that only consumers in Northern countries with substantial la-
bor market adjustment costs for both firms and workers enjoy a ‘double dividend’ from globalization:   29
a permanent reduction in unemployment and a temporary increase in the quality-growth rate of con-
sumer goods.
24 An increase in the job-finding rate (e.g., by decreasing the level or the duration of un-
employment benefit payments) mitigates the globalization effects in the same way as stricter IPRP in 
the South. The negative employment effect of globalization that results for sufficiently low firing costs 
in the North can be alleviated either by increasing R&D subsidies or by further reducing firing costs. If 
the job-finding rate is sufficiently low, however, this policy would necessarily come at the cost of a 
temporary quality-growth slowdown. 
Further research could try to endogenize Northern labor market institutions within this type of 
dynamic North-South non-scale growth models by adding a political-economy dimension. This could 
be fruitful since it appears to be an empirical regularity that employment protection and openness are 
positively correlated. For example, using the job protection index of Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) 
and the measure of openness from Penn World Tables, Mark 5.6, Agell (2002) shows that within a 
sample of 20 OECD countries between the early 1960s and the late 1970s, “[...] job protection in-
creased the most in those countries that got the most open” (ibid, p. 129).
25 As argued in this paper, the 
level of job protection (as captured by the firing costs) in open Northern economies is highly relevant 
for the qualitative effects of globalization shocks coming from the South. 
7  Appendices 
Appendix A: Derivation Of The Individual’s Consumption Demand Function (4) 
Defining a new state variable Φ with Φ(0) = 0, Φ(1) = c(t) and dΦ(ω)/dω = p(ω, t)⋅d(ω, t), the corre-
sponding Hamiltonian is H = [λ
[j(ω, t)/(σ − 1)]⋅d(ω, t)]
(σ − 1)/σ + ψ(ω)⋅p(ω, t)⋅d(ω, t), where ψ(ω) is the co-
state variable that belongs to Φ(ω). The f.o.c. are 
  ( )    0                  Hd d ψ ωψ ω ψ ω ∂ ∂Φ = = − ⇔ = ∀  ,  (A.1) 
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24  We are anxious to point out that our results do not imply the recommendation that Northern labor markets 
should be made inflexible enough such that Northern consumers are able to enjoy this double dividend from 
globalization. For example, a decrease in β would unambiguously raise the steady-state unemployment rate in 
two out of four cases summarized in Table 1, and an increase in firing costs can also have harmful employ-
ment or growth effects, as can be inferred from Table 2. The basic message is rather that there is no obvious 
reason to believe that consumers in Northern countries with particular inflexible labor markets should fear the 
globalization ‘threat’ more than others. Instead, globalization can help to mitigate their employment and 
growth problems. 
25  A theoretical reasoning for why the voters’ demand for employment protection increases along with exoge-
nous shocks that ceteris paribus tend to raise the steady-state innovation and growth rate is provided in the 
non-scale endogenous growth model of Grieben (2005). Globalization (as defined in this paper) could be one 
such shock, although it is not explicitly analyzed in that closed-economy model.   30
Inserting (A.2) into the budget constraint from (3) yields 
  () () () ( )
 1   1
 0
1, ,      p tq t d c t
σ σ σσ ψ ω ω ω
− ⎡− − ⋅ ⎤ ⋅ ⋅ = ⎣⎦ ∫  .  (A.3) 
Using (A.3) in (A.2) then gives (4). 
Appendix B: Derivation Of Equation (38) 
Inserting (4) into (2) and using the fact the households only consume goods with the lowest quality-
adjusted price gives individual instantaneous utility in the North as 
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ing the facts that wS is a constant fraction of wN (see (36)) and that I and C are constant in a steady-
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Inserting  NN cc  =cc  = NN ww  = 0, (21) and (26) into (B.2) gives (38). 
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Figure 1: Steady-State Equilibrium 
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Figure 2: Steady-state effects of globalization 








( 3 1 )
panel (a):   <   and  BB
crit crit


































Figure 3: Steady-state effects of rising R&D subsidies in the North 
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Figure 4: Steady-state effects of increasing Northern labor market flexibility 
 